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Historical legacies, particularly imperial tutelage and religion, have featured prominently
in recent scholarship on political regime variations in post-communist settings, chal-
lenging earlier temporally proximate explanations. The overlap between tutelage, geog-
raphy, and religion has complicated the uncovering of the spatially uneven effects of the
various legacies. The author addresses this challenge by conducting sub-national analysis
of religious inﬂuences within one imperial domain, Russia. In particular, the paper traces
how European settlement in imperial Russia has had a bearing on human development in
the imperial periphery. The causal mechanism that the paper proposes to account for this
inﬂuence is the Western communities’ impact on literacy, which is in turn linked in the
analysis to the Western Christian, particularly Protestant, roots, of settler populations. The
author makes this case by constructing an original dataset based on sub-national data from
the hitherto underutilised ﬁrst imperial census of 1897.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Does religion matter in accounting for spatially uneven
patterns of human capital development in Russia? Religion
has featured prominently in the debates on the legacy
underpinnings of democratic variations in various settings
(Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Huntington, 1996; Landes, 1998;
Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, 2003). However, the
substantial overlap between religion and imperial or, in the
case of former colonies, colonial, tutelage has complicated
the making of sound inferences about the weight of the
speciﬁcally religious imprint on human capital variations,
as opposed to that of the institutional legacies of imperial
or colonial tutelage (Fish, 1998). For instance, Christian-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hanynations that formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
are also largely Protestant or Catholic while those formerly
part of the Russian or Ottoman Empires have large Eastern
Orthodox and Muslim populations.
One possibility of addressing this dilemma is by con-
ducting sub-national analysis employing the territorial
domains of one imperial power as observations. Not only
does such an analysis allow to hold imperial tutelage
constant, but to also explore the effects of other potentially
signiﬁcant domestic variables in a more systematic way. As
a successor to the Russian Empire covering most of its
territorial landmass, Russia presents a good laboratory for
reﬁning our knowledge of how these respective variables
might matter for human capital. However, these a dearth of
scholarship on this topic. One apparent reason for this
omission is that the predominant “centre-centred” (Snyder,
2001) national-level analyses have forced a Huntingtonian
master narrative upon the discipline conceptualising Rus-
sia’s Christian religious tradition largely in terms of its
belongingness to Eastern Orthodoxy (Fish, 1998;
Huntington, 1996; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Welzel et al., 2003).angUniversity. ProducedanddistributedbyElsevier Limited.All rights reserved.
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human capital development have remained understudied.
I address this omission by tracing how European
settlement in imperial Russia has had a bearing on
human development in the imperial periphery. The key
causal mechanism that I propose to account for this
long-term inﬂuence of Western populations is the
settlers’ impact on literacy, which is in turn linked in my
analysis to the Western Christian, particularly Protestant,
roots, of settler populations. The paper is part of a wider
project to study the impact of historical legacies on
present-day human capital in territorially large states
like India and Russia. Assessing the impact of imperial
legacies on post-communist spatial developmental vari-
ations is beyond the scope of this paper however
uncovering factors inﬂuencing human capital variations
in the imperial periphery will hopefully constitute
building blocks for a more systematic exploration of how
these factors may shape present-day spatial develop-
mental variations.
For this study, I constructed an original dataset based on
data from the hitherto underutilised ﬁrst imperial census of
1897. The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss the
literature on historical legacies in formerly communist
states and Russian regions. This is followed by an excurse
into the history of European settlement and its impacts on
human capital development through literacy in Russian
provinces. I then present results of statistical analysis.
Concluding observations follow.
2. Theorising legacies
Historical legacies have featured prominently in recent
analyses of post-communist developmental variations
(Hanson, 1995; Kopstein, 2003; Pop-Eleches, 2007). Legacy
approaches have been advocated over those prioritising
more temporally proximate causal pathways to markets,
development, and democracy because the latter have
arguably failed to account for substantial variations in
developmental trajectories of Central and East European
states. Scholars have critiqued modernisation theories for
their failure to explore how industrial growth itself may be
linked to historical-cultural contexts (Kitschelt,
Mansfedova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999). At the same time,
they argued that twentieth century regime legacies of
communism, fascism, or authoritarianism could be linked
to historically-conditioned forms of institutions and state-
society relations that are likely to endure (Hanson, 1995,
p. 313; Bunce, 1999, p. 785; Kopstein, 2003).
Recent legacy scholarship has overwhelmingly focused
on Central European states however. Thomas Remington is
one of the few scholars of Russian regions who have sought
to systematically incorporate pre-communist develop-
mental effects into his analysis of Russian regional devel-
opmental variations (Remington, 2010). He has employed
1926 literacy ﬁgures as a proxy for pre-communist devel-
opment in his statistical analysis of political and economic
regime variations in Russia’s regions and found that it
positively correlateswith both urbanisation and democracy
in the 1990s (Remington, 2009). He suggests that the 1926
census ﬁgure is in turn reﬂective of pre-revolutionary socialdevelopment legacies before industrialisation, collectiv-
isation, and urbanisation drives of the Stalin and post-Stalin
periods. The study therefore hints at the potentially
importantmechanism of past legacies of human capital and
literacy in particular however, it stops short of extending
the causality further to explore factors which account for
variations in pre-communist human capital development.
Two other recent studies, albeit not speciﬁcally con-
cerned with Russia, have more closely examined the
educational component of pre-communist historical lega-
cies. Schooling features as a key explanatory variable in
Peisakhin’s study of sub-national democratic orientations
in formerly Russian and Hapsburg territories of present-
day Ukraine however rather than focussing on the human
capital component of the quality of schooling a more
complex argument is proposed which privileges the
substance of the curriculum. In a fascinating survey-based
attempt to study history’s natural experiment Peisakhin
shows how the contrasting contemporary “behavioural
scripts” in post-communist Ukrainian provinces which
share a common legacy of communism, are rooted in the
curriculum content that the various communities had been
exposed to. These variations could be in turn traced to the
institutional legacies of modes of the incorporation of
minority ethnic groups going back centuries. Thus, resi-
dents of the formerly Russian imperial territories, subjected
to a policy of the suppression of their Little Russian identity,
only a few miles apart from their formerly Habsburg
Ukrainian neighbours where Ruthenian identity was
actively encouraged, are far less likely to espouse critical
attitudes towards the government and vote. Peisakhin
suggests that the imperial-era Church and schooling
systems were the key institutional determinants of local
identities, nurturing or suppressing ethnic distinctiveness
(Peisakhin, 2010).
Likewise, in their cross-national study of post-
communist regime trajectories Darden and Grzymala-
Busse suggest that pre-communist nationalist curriculum
content in the more literate imperial peripheries accounts
for variations in the willingness of East European nations to
dislodge communist parties (Darden & Grzymala-Busse,
2006). An intriguing question however is what accounts
for such stark variations in levels of schooling and speciﬁ-
cally literacy before communism. Neither study systemat-
ically addresses this question, though Darden and
Grzymala-Busse note the importance of variations in
levels of socio-economic development among the least
literate nomadic societies in Central Asia and their more
literate Slavic counterparts and those in more developed
Central European provinces. They therefore fall back on
the modernisation argument in locating the roots of
literacy in the variable levels of modernisation of imperial
peripheries.
Given the well-known cultural differences between
Central Asian Muslim or Animist, Slavic-Orthodox, and
Western Christian societies, this reference to the stark
literacy variations among the above societies begs the
question of the extent towhichmodernisationmay be itself
a product of cultural factors that may need to be disen-
tangled from other variables. Modernisation may shape
political value orientations however culture, largely
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endogenous to modernisation. Indeed, in the Darden and
Grzymala-Busse study, among the top pre-communist
literacy achievers with the highest share of non-
communist party votedSlovenia, Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Western Ukraine, Latvia, Lith-
uania, Estonia, Georgia, and Armeniadall but the latter two
have been historically exposed to the Latin Church or the
Protestant tradition.
Scholars from Montesquieu, to Weber, to Putnam, and
Huntington have highlighted the importance for demo-
cratic development of the denominational nuances gov-
erning the relationships among Church and state and
affecting citizen value and political authority orientations
(Huntington, 1996; Montesquieu, 1949; Putnam, 1993;
Weber, Baehr, & Wells, 2002). Likewise, religion has been
one of the major paradigms employed in post-communist
democratisation studies. According to one school of
thought, having a pre-communist tradition of a mediated,
ritual-based religion rather than that based on minimal
ritual and direct relation to God has arguably put a stamp
on political cultural pre-dispositions in various parts of
communist and post-communist Europe (Jowitt, 1992). The
second key strand of theorising on religion regards the
Church as a transmitter of a legal tradition. Thus, states like
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary with a history of
association with Roman law through the Latin Church have
been juxtaposed to Bulgaria and Romania, with their ties to
Byzantium and the Greek Church and comparatively late
development of codiﬁcation of law (Elster, Offe, & Preuss,
1998). These distinct patterns of deference to political
authority and rule of law, as Elster et al. argue, may simply
have “hibernated” during the communist episode, only to
resurface again to “determine the future of post-
communist societies” (Elster et al., 1998, p. 36).
These two strands of theorising therefore privilege the
attitudinal and the institutional dimensions of a religious
tradition. I here propose a complimentary causal mecha-
nism, which focuses on the religious dimension of literacy,
speciﬁcally on the role of Western Christian tradition in the
spread of literacy in Russia’s imperial periphery. It is well
known that the development of literacy has been central to
the Protestant tradition due to the importance of Bible
reading in the vernaculars for all believers. Scholars have
also demonstrated how Protestant Christianity in turn
spurred intense inter-denominational competition and
gradual inter-Church convergence in the provision of mass
education, as opposed to that available solely to the higher
elite or clergy (Bayly, 1989; Berger, 1969; Frykenberg, 2003;
Zhuk, 2004). Thus, in contexts where the Protestant Church
had become an important provider of schooling for disad-
vantaged groups, the Catholic Church has also shown
a greater willingness to sponsor education as a means to
attract or retain adherents (Trejo, 2009; Woodberry, 2004).
By contrast, Eastern Christian traditions, not exposed to
conversionary Protestant Christianity, as well as such other
religions as Islam, discouraged the development of mass
literacy. Many Eastern Christian Churches to the present
day continue to rely on such archaic languages as Church
Slavonic or Aramaic in liturgy. The Islamic tradition
encouraged the development of reading skills for rotememorisation of the Koran, but not writing. Thus, in colo-
nial India, census takers reported problems in dis-
tinguishing among literate and illiterate populations
because many Indian Muslims could read, but not write
(Hutton, 1933). Religious traditions also affected literacy
levels by gender: while in the Protestant tradition, both
boys and girls were expected to be literate to go through
Conﬁrmation, in Islam, women were discouraged from
learning, hence the continuing wide gaps in literacy and
access to higher education among men and women in
traditionally Islamic societies (Fish, 2002).
Assessing the effects of pre-communist literacy on long-
term human capital and democratic effects in Russian
regions is beyond the scope of this study. However,mapping
and explaining spatial variations in pre-communist human
capital development will hopefully be a ﬁrst step in linking
imperial-era variations to present-day disparities in Rus-
sia’s regional development. Yet, howdowebegin touncover
the literacy effects of the various religious traditions given
the noted overlap among the religious, institutional, social,
and economic legacies in post-communist settings (Elster
et al., 1998; Fish, 1999; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Welzel et al.,
2003)? Over a decade ago Fish thus formulated the meth-
odological challenge of disentangling these various effects:
“Cultural traditions and imperial tutelage legaciesmay hold
some promise as explanations,” however “given the overlap
between religious tradition, geographical location, and the
history of imperial tutelage, it is impossible (emphasis
added) to separate out the possible weight of these factors”
(Fish, 1999, p. 797). “Were societies with various major
religious compositions scattered more randomly across
geographical space, generalising about the signiﬁcance of
religious tradition per se might be possible,” hewrote (Fish,
1998, p. 223).
Russia could help us more conclusively assess the rela-
tive weight of the legacies of religion in human capital
development because of the more “random” distribution of
an important source of the diffusion of western Christian
inﬂuence on the imperial periphery, namely 18th-early 20th
century European colonies stretching as far East as Siberia.
A large share of the populations, roughly two thirds, in these
colonies were Protestants, but there were also sizeable
communities, close to a quarter of all settlers, belonging to
the Catholic faith (Stricker, 1994). The key driving force
behind migration were the consequences of religious wars
plaguing Europe in the 16th–17th centuries. These largely
rural populations in some parts of the Russian periphery
formed sizeable populations or enjoyed numerical
predominance. The mark that they have left on the socio-
economic landscape of hitherto sparsely populated impe-
rial peripheries has been only recently systematically
documented in imperial historiography (Cherkazyanova,
1999; Dahlmann, 1996; Eisfeld, 1992; Fleischhauer, 1986;
German, 1992; Kabuzan, 2003; Keim, 2006; Long, 1988;
Neutatz, 1994; Pleve, 1998; Popkova, 2007; Schippan &
Striegnitz, 1992; Shramkova, 2007; Stricker, 1994; Vesnina,
1995; Wiebe, 2007; Zhuk, 2004); political science scholar-
ship of post-communist national and sub-national political
and developmental variations has neglected this topic.
While the settlement of these communities was
“random” in the sense of a disassociation between empire,
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choice of speciﬁc location of settlement within the Russian
empire ought to be also considered. In a recent volume on
“natural experiments” in history, Diamond and Robinson
ﬂagged the methodological challenge of establishing cause
and effect in “perturbed” societies experiencing externally-
driven or exogenous change (Diamond & Robinson, 2010).
“A question invariably arising in any comparative study
that compares perturbed societies or sites with non-
perturbed ones concerns the perturbers’ ‘selection’ of
which particular sites to perturb,” they write (Diamond &
Robinson, 2010, p. 262). Thus, European settlers in neo-
Europes may have been more driven to “patch selection”
in areas already hospitable from climatic or resource point
of view; and Napoleonic armies may have well chosen to
invade areas in Europe already more developed, which
could plausibly account for the better institutional legacies
in the invaded areas (Diamond & Robinson, 2010). In the
Russian case, we know from historical scholarship on the
newly acquired frontier territories that the settlers did not
choose where to settle: they were allocated land by
imperial ﬁat in climatically harsh, undeveloped, and
otherwise inhospitable areas. In such areas previous
attempts at development by encouraging Russian or
indigenous animistic or Muslim inhabitants to cultivate
land there had not been very successful (Koch, 1977). What
makes this analysis interesting is that settler colonies were
often adjacent to, or interspersed with, Russian or non-
Russian Asian minorities. Statistics on literacy and other
development indicators for the various communities allow
us to take stock of the effects of these pre-existing condi-
tions. In the next section, I provide an historical overview of
the origin and human capital effects of these communities
in Russia’s imperial peripheries. I then back this discussion
with statistical analysis.3. European settlement in Russia and its impact on
literacy
European mini-colonies had long been a feature of
urban life in Russia however until the mid-18th century
they had been largely limited to the north-West and West
reaches of the Empire. On the imperial frontier mass
European settlement, particularly from Germanic lands,
occurred by imperial ﬁat in the mid-18th century at the
invitation of Catherine the Great, a German Princess. It
continued in subsequent waves of colonisation until the
early 20th century. By the time of the Russian Revolution in
1917, there were some 10,000 settlements in ﬁfty-three
regions, and their population exceeded 3.5 million (Zhuk,
2004). On Russia’s present-day territory, the ﬁrst settle-
ments appeared in the 1760s on the Middle Volga; by the
time of the ﬁrst imperial 1897 census the settlers consti-
tuted 22.48 percent of the region’s population (390,864).
While Lutherans formed a sizeable proportion of the
German Protestant communities1dtwo thirdsdthere were1 Germans constituted 40 percent of all Protestants in Russia, while the
remaining 60 percent were largely composed of Latvians and Estonians
(Kappeler, 1994).also adherents of other Protestant denominations
(Kappeler, 1994). In 1765, some 20 miles away from Tsar-
itsyn, at one time Stalingrad, and currently Volgograd, the
village of Sarepta was founded by the Moravian Brethren
from Saxony. The Brethren, critical of the doctrinal and
ritualistic tendencies of other Churches were credited with
spreading an individualistic religion and the practice of
prayer meetings in the area.2 In the middle of the 19th
century the Mennonites, another radical Protestant group
claiming Dutch descent, also settled on the Volga (Epp,
1994). The Mennonites became the key founders of
daughter colonies in Omsk in the 1890s (Cherkazyanova,
1999). At that time, the government encouraged new
settlements in Siberia due to the construction of the Trans-
Siberian railway in 1891. Following land reform, there was
another wave of Siberian migration in 1907–09; many
Volga settlers sold their land and purchased larger plots
around Omsk and Altay (Koch, 1977; Shaydurov, 2002).
These colonies contributed to the proliferation of what
Bunce conceptualises as “multiple peripheries” character-
istic of empires that often suffer from weak institutional
penetration and internal uniformity (Bunce, 2005). Such
peripheries vary not just by predominant ethnicity, reli-
gion, and levels of economic development, but also “rights,
responsibilities, identities, and institutions” (Bunce, 2005,
p. 416). The settlers’ “pragmatic protection” (Zhuk, 2004, p.
41) was at the outset a matter of policydthere was
a substantial degree of imperial toleration of settler self-
government, freedom of religion, and education. The
colonists had the status of peasants, which differed from
that of both serfs and state peasants. The colonists had the
right to choose their own self-governing authorities on an
annual basis, and this right was stipulated in a special
charter (Kabuzan, 2003; Neutatz, 1994; Pleve, 1998).
The colonies became known in particular for their
institutions of mass schooling, which were highly advanced
in the context of the largely illiterate Russian provincial
rural settings. On the southern and eastern frontier, as early
as the third quarter of the 18th century, it was the European
settler who set up the ﬁrst public schools. Religion was the
driving force for the literacy project. The settlers were keen
to set up a school with each congregation which was fun-
ded publicly by the settlers themselves (Kahle, 1994; Keim,
2006; Koch, 1977). The settlers’ average literacy rates were
substantially higher than those of other rural residents. In
the early Saratov German colonies, the average male and
female literacy rates were 70 and 56 percent, respectively.
The Russians’ overall average in Saratov was 25 percent
(Shaydurov, 2005). Table 1 presents literacy and religion
statistics for the gubernii.
Both the Catholic and Protestant communities main-
tained similar institutions of mass schooling linked to the
Church and providing literacy and numeracy skills to boys
and girls of pre-Conﬁrmation ages. Some German scholars
have documented the poorer quality of Catholic schools as
compared to those of Protestants in neighbouring2 The deep roots of this movement were evident well into the Soviet
period when clandestine Brotherhood prayer meetings persisted as an
expression of spiritual independence and strength.
Table 1
Literacy and religion in pre-communist regions (gubernii).
Top 20 gubernii, literacy – gubernii also in the top 20 by share of
Protestants and Catholics are highlighted
Literacy Female literacy
St. Peter. cit 62.6 St. Peter. cit 51.5
Moscow city 56.3 St. Petersburg 43.8
St. Petersburg 55.1 Moscow city 42.3
Moskovskaya 40.2 Moskovskaya 25.5
Yaroslavskaya 36.2 Yaroslavskaya 24
Vladimirskaya 27 Samarskaya 14.1
Sahalin isl 26.8 Saratovskaya 13.6
Olonetskaya 25.3 Vladimirskaya 13.4
Amurskaya 24.8 Sahalin isl 12.5
Primorskaya 24.7 Kostromskaya 12.3
Tverskaya 24.5 Amurskaya 11.9
Kostromskaya 24 Tverskaya 11.9
Saratovskaya 23.8 Arkhangelskaya 11.7
Arkhangelskaya 23.3 Uﬁmskaya 11.7
Novgorodskaya 23 Orenburgskaya 11.4
Donskogo voysk 22.4 Nizhegorodskaya 11.1
Samarskaya 22.1 Kazanskaya 11.1
Nizhegorodskaya 22 Permskaya 10.8
Tulskaya 20.7 Novgorodskaya 10.7
Orenburgskaya 20.4 Olonetskaya 10
Top 20 gubernii, share of Protestants and Catholics
Protestants Catholics
St. Petersburg 12.68 Sahalin isl 6.56
St. Peter. cit 7.85 St. Peter. cit 4.24
Samarskaya 6.26 St. Petersburg 3.1
Saratovskaya 5.61 Samarskaya 2.09
Pskovskaya 2.32 Primorskaya 1.65
Moscow city 2.1 Moscow city 1.46
Sahalin isl 1.75 Saratovskaya 1.45
Simbirskaya 1.27 Eniseyskaya 1.11
Donskogo voysk 1.19 Irkutskaya .82
Stavropolskaya 1.05 Moskovskaya .73
Terskaya 1.05 Terskaya .61
Novgorodskaya 1 Astrahanskaya .58
Kubanskaya .98 Smolenskaya .56
Moskovskaya .97 Tobolskaya .51
Eniseyskaya .69 Pskovskaya .49
Olonetskaya .67 Tomskaya .46
Arkhangelskaya .59 Kubanskaya .4
Amurskaya .51 Donskogo voysk .39
Primorskaya .48 Dagestanskaya .39
Astrahanskaya .48 Novgorodskaya .35
Note: census ﬁgures are likely to be substantially lower than actual share
of adherents because of reluctance of Slavic converts to identify with non-
Orthodox faith (Zhuk, 2004).
3 This explains the staggering growth of Mennonite communities in
Russia – by 1914, a ﬁfth, or nearly 100,000, of all Mennonites in the world
resided in Russia (Brandenburg, 1974).
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however to the Catholics’ reliance on priests from Poland
and the Baltic lands, often dispatched to the “wilderness”
because of misdemeanours or incompetence. The latter,
who usually did not speak ﬂuent German, were less partial
to quality instruction in the German villages as compared
to German Lutheran or Mennonite priests. A contributing
factor to this variation was that generally, the quality of the
Lutheran or Reformed clergy tended to be higher than that
of Catholics because of the expectation of their deeper
involvement in parish affairs (Stricker, 1994). Still, both the
Catholic and Protestant schools stood out in the sea of
Orthodox illiteracy (Kahle, 1994).
The role of the settlers’ clergy in the maintenance of the
school systems found no parallels in Russian villages. The
Orthodox Church was not institutionally associated withprimary education provision in the same way that it had
been in post-Reformation Europe (Kahle, 1994). Unlike in
Europe, the Baltic lands, Poland and parts of Ukraine, where
the school systems had come to be linked to the Church, the
concept of public schooling was unknown in Russia until
the 19th century when the government ﬁnally decided to
set up basic public education (Luchterhandt, 1994). In
Europe, the Reformation accorded a special role to the
Church in promoting literacy in the vernaculars. By
contrast, the Orthodox Church tradition was that of
“restricted literacy” whose practical utility was conﬁned to
reading the scriptures and religious texts or performing
service in Church Slavonic. It is not by chance that the
historian Brook’s fascinating book When Russia Learned to
Read is almost exclusively focused on the 19th century.
When the 1917 Revolution broke out, plans for universal
rural schooling had been only partially implemented
(Brooks, 1985).
The colonists inﬂuenced the spread of literacy among
Russians both directly through introducing their Russian
labourers to the rudiments of reading and numeracy, and
indirectly, through encouraging conversion to Protestant
Christianity. Russian labourers preferred the better paying
German to Russian employers (Brandenburg, 1974;
Brandes, 1994; Neutatz, 1994; Shaydurov, 2005; Zhuk,
2004). Mennonite employers were also known to provide
labourers with housing, schools, and places of worship
(Brandes, 1994). After the serfs were emancipated, there
was greater contact with Russian peasants. Many Russian
peasants worked as labourers on German and Dutch farms,
and their numbers increased when they migrated to the
south and Siberia in search of employment. There are
records of conversion to Protestant Christianity as a result
of such contact with European households (Nesdoly, 1986;
Zhuk, 2004). During the ﬁrst decades of European settle-
ment, active proselytising among Russian peasants was
uncommon. This changed during the mid-19 century
Protestant revival, when such conversionary movements as
Stundism, Millenarianism, and Separatism germinated in
the periphery, often in clandestine settings (Zhuk, 2004).
The settlers, more exposed to European religious and
intellectual currents, became transmitters of the new
teachings to the local populations despite surveillance and
obstruction by the authorities (Tuchtenhagen, 1994; Zhuk,
2004). The Mennonites in particular, on grounds of reli-
gious conscience ﬂouted the imperial ban on proselytising
among Russian Orthodox populations.3 The historian Zhuk
documents how exposure to Protestant congregational
activity among Russian peasants led to important lifestyle
changes, such as sobriety, and, most notably, the acquisi-
tion of reading, writing, and numeracy skills (Zhuk, 2004).
Literacy in turn had profound implications for social uplift.
Even basic literacy was often sufﬁcient for a peasant to
acquire employment as shop assistant, coachman, or clerk
in the zemstvo bodies. After peasant emancipation, literate
peasants were in the best position to proﬁt from the
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(Brooks, 1985).
The settlers are also associated with the development of
more advanced forms of learning. As in the American mid-
West, which became host to similar waves of German
migration from Europe in the 18–19 centuries (Turner,
1962), German settlers are associated with the establish-
ment and development of superb higher educational
institutions (Smirnova, 2006). Saratov, the centre of Volga
German colonies, acquired nation-wide reputation as
a centre of progressive education on a par with Moscow
and St. Petersburg (Popkova, 2007). Settler schooling
during the earlier phase of settlement was largely at the
primary level, was focused on preparing the children for
Conﬁrmation, and was limited to settler pupils. In 1869, the
colonists-controlled Kamyshin District zemstvo petitioned
the Ministry of Public Education to introduce compulsory
primary education in the entire district, covering both the
colonists and non-colonist Russian peasants, but did not
receive state authorisation to do so. The desire for more
sophisticated secular education and social advancement in
the wider Russian society eventually led the colonists to
found institutions of higher learning for Germans, but with
Russian language instruction (Long, 1988). This in turn led
to an inﬂux of Russian pupils into these public and private
institutions (Shramkova, 2007). Thus, in the D. F. Hesse
private college for boys in 1883, thirty-four students were
Protestants, eighteen were Orthodox, and three were
Catholics. In another private school founded by the theo-
logian Gustave Schoemburg, in 1884, out of the eighty-
eight pupils, sixty were Protestants, twenty-six were
Orthodox, and two were Catholics. The colonists’ models of
elementary and advanced public schooling and teacher
training colleges, pioneering for the frontier “barren of
public enlightenment,” were replicated outside of the
colonies (Cherkazyanova, 1999; Koch, 1977).
The settlers had been also leaders in girls’ schooling,
thereby contributing to the social uplift of women. As late
as in 1894, when progressive zemstvo schooling reforms
had been long under way, only 8291 out of a total 39,567 of
the Russian pupils in Saratov, or 20.9 percent, were girls. By
contrast, among settler pupils, there were 13,198 girls out
of the total number of 27,246, or 48.5 percent (Popkova,
2007). It became increasingly common for Russian girls to
attend German private schools where both Russian and
German were taught. Thus, one of the most prestigious
gymnasia for girls, founded in 1865 by the German teacher
Pauline Zemmering as Saratov’s ﬁrst private school for girls,
in 1883 had 152 female pupils, 117 of which were Russian
Orthodox, thirty were Protestants, and four were Catholic
(Shramkova, 2007). The mid-19 century Protestant revival
gave further impetus to the social elevation of women
(Zhuk, 2004). Contemporary observers commented on the
prominent role of travelling female “agents” representing
Baptist and other Protestant sects, who were literate and
well-read and worked to satisfy the craving among female
peasants for basic literacy (Brooks, 1985).
Finally, European populations also contributed to the
development of schooling through their involvement on
the zemstva local government bodies. The zemstva local
government bodies were set up in the context of Russia’spolitical liberalisation in the 1860s. Despite arbitrary and
often massive state interference in their affairs, the zemstva
had the most freedom of manoeuvre in two areas in which
their reliance on police and peasant ofﬁcials was the
weakest, namely public health and education. In 1890, the
government promulgated a new zemstvo statute. Contrary
to the original intention of theMinister of Internal Affairs D.
A. Tolstoi, the key ofﬁcial in charge of the reform, the
zemstva retained their overall relative autonomy from both
regional governors and state ofﬁcials, germinating into
islands of political opposition to the autocratic tsarist
regime. At the same time, the new mechanisms that were
introduced to improve coordination in public services
among the zemstva and other bodies, as well as to
encourage participation for the educated middle classes in
the hitherto gentry-dominated bodies, resulted in spec-
tacular improvements in public healthcare and education
in the provinces. In the three year period between 1895 and
1898, the zemstva built over 3300 schools, which surpassed
the total number constructed in the six year period
between 1878 and 1894. Between 1896 and 1901, the
zemstva spent on average 38,200 roubles annually on
education, a ﬁgure that by far exceeded that of 5900
roubles in the 1881–1890 period. For the ﬁrst time since the
inception of these bodies in the 1860s, they also started
collecting data on peasant illiteracy (Pearson, 1989).
There remained however substantial regional varia-
tions in zemstva institutional performance, their ability to
enforce local taxation, and their choice of expenditure
priorities (Pearson, 1989). From the outset of zemstvo
reform in 1864 the colonists were given the right to
participate in zemstvo self-government (Brandes, 1994).
The settlers had come to form majorities in two of the
forty of the 360 county zemstva with majority rural
representation, Kamyshin in the Volga area, and Akker-
man in Bessarabia. In Kamyshin, the head of the zemstvo
from 1866 to 1899 was the settler Peter Louck, “effusively
lauded for his excellent management of the zemstvo
budget, vigorous promotion of public education, success-
ful organisation of village granaries stocked with grain in
case of crop failures, initiation of the zemstvo insurance
program, and maintaining harmonious relations within
the zemstvo by reconciling and mediating the interests
and concerns of the Russian peasantry and Volga Ger-
mans” (Long, 1988, pp. 163–64). After 1890, the number of
zemstva board and committees increased and the so-
called “third element” of doctors, teachers, agronomists
and representatives of other middle class professions
were invited to sit on these bodies without necessarily
being elected zemstvo members. The colonists became
famously active on the zemstva committees. These boards
were also signiﬁcant in that for the ﬁrst time the non-
settler peasants and colonists were to jointly administer
local affairs. The zemstva in which the colonists had
a strong inﬂuence either because they formed elected
majorities or because they had been active on the various
unelected committees, became among the most progres-
sive in Russia. Until 1901, the colonists-dominated
Novouzensk district zemstvo led all of the Samara Prov-
ince districts in the share of expenditure on education,
while other zemstva with a large share of colonists sitting
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education reform their highest priority (Long, 1988).4. Statistical analysis
The imperial period part of the analysis is based on an
author-constructed dataset with data from the ﬁrst Impe-
rial Census of 1897 (Troynitskiy, 1905). After excluding
imperial administrative territories that do not form part of
the current territory of the Russian Federation, the dataset
for Russia has forty-six observations corresponding to the
forty-six gubernii. The independent variables employed in
the ﬁrst part of the analysis are as follows. The main
independent variables are Protestants and Catholics as
measured by the percentage share of these groups in the
population. Additional religion and ethnicity control vari-
ables of Russian Orthodox, ethnic Russian, and Old Believer
populations are also employed in the analysis. Even a brief
glance at imperial statistics reveals that Russians, them-
selves far behind in literacy as compared toWestern settler
populations, had far better human capital indicators than
those of some of the conquered nomadic steppe Muslim
and Animist populations. Some peripheral areas also had
particularly high concentrations of Old Believer Pop-
ulations, dissident communities who had been likened to
Protestants in their denial of predominant religious
doctrine and distinct lifestyle. Including the above variables
enables us to control for the effects of these religious and
cultural factors on human capital outcomes in the gubernii.
The control variables for modernisation are the percentage
share of populations belonging to the category of “peasants
of all titles”; and the percentage share of the population
belonging to the census category of meshchane, which
could be roughly translated as the bourgeoisie.
The variable of population share of those residing
outside of the region inwhich they were born (“outsiders”)
is also included. This variable enables us to control for the
legacies of serfdom in the gubernii. Scholars have hypoth-
esised that these legacies may have an impact on human
capital and democratic orientations in post-communist
settings. By the mid-19 century, substantial regional vari-
ations in the practice of the institution of serfdom had
developed. In some regions in Siberia, the Middle Volga,
and Southern Russia with a history of European settlement
a high proportion of the population was composed of
escaped or freed serfs who, even before serfdom was
abolished, moved from the Black Earth areas of Central
Russia that historically had a high association with
serfdom. It is also well known that, decades after the
abolition of serfdom, many peasants remained ﬁnancially
bonded to their landlords, thereby limiting their mobility.
So, including this variable also provides conﬁdence that our
Europeans variable does not proxy for that of the con-
trasting legacies of serfdom in the various gubernii. The
dependent variables are population percentage share of
literates, female literates, and literates among Russians. All
variables in the analysis have been logged. For the ﬁrst part
of the analysis, I hypothesise that having a larger share of
Western settler, particularly Protestant, populations positively
affects literacy and female literacy in particular and that inregions with a higher share of settlers the Russian populations
are also more likely to be literate.
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis was
conducted testing several models. In Model 1, overall
population literacy is postulated to be a function of the
agrarian-urban structure, as well as of speciﬁcally cultural
variables of Protestant and ethnically Russian populations.
The variable of population share of those residing outside
of the region in which they were born (“outsiders”) is also
included. There is a positive and high statistical correlation
between share of Protestants and Catholics due to the
territorial overlap in the settlement of these mostly Euro-
pean communities. These two variables therefore could not
be included at the same time.
The results are presented in Table 2. Model 1 shows that,
as expected, Protestants have a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant effect on literacy, as do “outsiders” and mesh-
chane. The share of Russian populations does not appear to
have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on literacy. The coef-
ﬁcient for the key independent variable suggests that for
every one percent increase in the share of Protestant pop-
ulations, there is a .22 percent increase in the share of
literates. The R square for this model indicates that 66
percent of the variation is explained. In Model 2 when I
substitute Protestantism for Catholicism, we see that the
effects forWestern Christianity still hold and the coefﬁcient
for Catholicism is almost identical to the one for Protestants
in Model 1, while the R square, at 68, is slightly higher than
that in Model 1. Next, in Models 3 and 4, I ascertain the
effects of western Christianity on female literacy and ﬁnd
that the results for the effects of Catholics and Protestants
are not substantially different with the coefﬁcients iden-
tical, but the R square at 63 is slightly higher in the model
for Protestants as compared to Catholics (61).
Next, in Models 5 and 6, I explore the effects of diffusion
of literacy from amongst settler populations to ethnic
Russians. In this model I also include the variable of Old
Believers to ascertain the extent to which literacy was more
prevalent among dissident religious Russian communities.
Because of the high correlation between meshchane and
Protestant share, this measure of urbanisation is sensitive
to model speciﬁcation and wipes off the effect of Protes-
tantism and Catholicism in the Russian literacy models
(regressions not included in the tables). I therefore substi-
tute it with the alternative measure of peasant share in the
population. The models show thatWestern Christianity has
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on literacy
among Russians. In particular, in the Protestant Model 5, for
every one percent increase in the share of Protestants, there
is a .27 percent increase in literacy among Russians; and for
every one percent increase in the share of Catholics, there is
a slightly lower, .21 percent, increase in literacy among
Russians. As expected, peasant share has a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant effect on literacy among Russians;
there are also more literates in areas with a weaker
historical legacy of serfdom. At the same time, Russian
Orthodoxy has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect
on literacy among Russians. Belonging to the dissident
community of old Believers does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant effect on literacy. The R square, at 42, is slightly
lower in Model 6 that includes Catholics as compared to
Table 2
Settler effects on literacy.
Literacy Model 1 Model 2
Variables Coeff. (stand. B) T Sig. Coeff. T Sig.
Protestant .227 2.087 .043
Russian .156 1.483 .146 .161 1.516 .137
Meshchane .369 3.282 .002 .416 3.952 .000
Outsiders .476 4.694 .000 .494 4.933 .000
Catholics .219 2.190 .034
R sq. .66 .68
Constant 3.579 .001 3.414 .001
Female literacy Model 3 Model 4
Variables Coeff. (stand. B) T Sig. Coeff. T Sig.
Russian .146 1.335 .189 .162 1.393 .171
Meshchane .393 3.367 .002 .454 3.942 .000
Outsiders .399 3.799 .000 .403 3.681 .001
Protestant .269 2.390 .022
Catholic .200 1.829 .075
R sq. .63 .61
Constant .114 .910 .590 .559
Russian literacy Model 5 Model 6
Variables Coeff. (stand. B) T Sig. Coeff. T Sig.
Protestant .271 2.177 .035
Orthodox .411 3.013 .004 .401 2.715 .010
Outsiders .529 3.238 .002 .553 3.108 .004
Old Believers .083 .583 .563 .020 .138 .891
Peasants .477 2.999 .005 .472 2.618 .013
Catholics .219 1.626 .112
R sq. .44 .42
Constant 8.049 .000 7.039 .000
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ﬁgure is 44.
5. Discussion
The analysis shows how European settlers in the impe-
rial periphery,while politicallymarginal,were instrumental
in building human capital through mass literacy. Further-
more, rather than being limited to settlers themselves, there
was also diffusion of grammar and numeracy as well as
more formal schooling to non-European Orthodox Russian
and other populations. The settlers were also instrumental
in establishing the institutional foundations for the inter-
temporal transmission and development of education
through their gubernii-wide involvement in the setting up
of schools. Brooks’ work demonstrates how literacy in turn
spurred the processes of social class mobility from peasant
to the petty bourgeois, adding dynamism to the rural
economy, while also facilitating movement away from
villages to towns (Brooks, 1985).
Contrary to the initial hypothesis about the signiﬁcance
of the Protestant literacy tradition, only slight variations are
observed between the Protestant and Catholic imprints on
literacy. These results correspond to classic theorising in
the sociology of religion and recent empirical ﬁndings on
the homogenising education effects of inter-
denominational competition in post-Reformation Western
and non-Western settings experiencing conversionary
Protestant Christianity (Berger, 1969; Trejo, 2009;
Woodberry, 2004). Protestants are however associated
with somewhat higher levels of female literacy and literacy
among Russians in this study.The paucity of religion data complicates the making of
assessments about the legacy of European settlement in
present-day Russian regions. Because of massive Stalin-era
population resettlement, ideally we would want to employ
data on religious composition in the regions during the late
communist and post-communist periods. These data could
be useful for exploring the inter-generational transmission
of the values and practice of educational attainment char-
acteristic of settler populations despite the overall sovie-
tised context; our evidence however is limited to anecdotal
or case study accounts of communities in speciﬁc regions.
The last communist census of 1989 did not have a question
on religion due to ofﬁcial communist policy. Plans to
incorporate a question on religious afﬁliation into the 2002
census had been abandoned ostensibly because of the
separation of Church and state in Russia, but by some
accounts due to sustained lobbying by the Russian
Orthodox Church (Heleniak, 2006). The Church is con-
cerned about the growing number of Russians converting
to Western Christian denominations or more openly asso-
ciating themselves with the Church of their ancestors, as is
apparently the case with those Russian Germans who
remain in the country. A study by the Keston Institute has
sought to catalogue the history and current practice of the
various Christian Churches in Russian regions. One inter-
esting ﬁnding of the study is that the Evangelical and
Catholic Churches originally established by the German
settlers in the Middle Volga and Siberian regions are
increasingly attracting ethnic Russian believers from
amongst the regional intelligentsias; in fact, the majority of
parishes of these Churches are often comprised of ethnic
Russians (Burdo & Filatov, 2009). Unfortunately, in what is
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challenges of this undertaking in the present-day Russian
political context, no systematic data on the numerical
strength of the various religious communities had been
gathered. Surveys on religious adherence have been con-
ducted by other scholars in isolated regions like Tula, Vor-
onezh, Krasnodar, and Nizhny Novgorod, which revealed
that up to 3.5 percent of regional populations belong to
non-Orthodox Christian Churches (Lunkin, 2008). Accord-
ing to another survey commissioned by the Presidential
Plenipotentiary in the Volga District, Sergey Kirienko, in
some regions of the district 15–32 percent of the pop-
ulation identiﬁed themselves as adherents of Western
Christian Churches.4 These data are only available for the
Volga district however and therefore could not be
employed in this study. Moreover, it is unclear what
methodology was used to ascertain the number of adher-
ents. The Russian scholar of religion Roman Lunkin has
sought to more systematically ascertain the Christian
composition of regional populations by estimating the
number of Russian Orthodox and non-Russian Orthodox
Christian parishes and active parishioners in the regions
(Lunkin, 2008). However, this is a highly imperfect measure
as the numbers of parishioners are only rough estimates. In
addition, Lunkin notes that the ofﬁcial ﬁgures for parishes
registered with the Federal Registration Service are nearly
half the number of the actual existing parishes. Unlike the
Russian Orthodox Church, the Catholic and Protestant
Churches tend to register the headquarters of the main
parish, but not the other branch ofﬁces afﬁliated with it
(Lunkin, 2008).5 The hitherto underutilised 1897 census
therefore remains the most systematic source of religion
data for anyone undertaking analysis of Russia’s sub-
national human capital variations in the imperial period.References
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